Kingsley Wickremasuriya

[Ed. Note: The writer is a retired senior deputy inspector general (DIG) of police holding the degrees of master's of public administration, master's of science and a postgraduate diploma in international affairs. The article appeared in the Sri Lankan newspaper The Island.]

A democracy is heavily dependent on its police to maintain the degree of order that makes a free society possible. Police, therefore, perform the vital democratic function of keeping and maintaining the good order of society. In fact, one may even argue that the strength of a democracy and the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens are determined to a large extent by the ability of the police to discharge their duties effectively without fear or favour.

Admittedly, police are one of the main bulwarks of a democracy. This is in theory. However, looking at what occurs in practice, particularly in Sri Lanka, one wonders about the credibility of this theory. The demonstrations that were held against the police not long ago in several places and the cry for an independent police commission by certain political groups in recent months are manifestations of this doubt. What has come to be questioned is the impartiality of the police. Does this mean that there is a serious erosion of public confidence in the police? Anything that undermines public confidence in the police is a national danger and a threat to democracy. This article will address two of the main issues that could help restore public confidence in the police. They are the establishment of an independent police commission and the position of the inspector general of police (IGP).

The Problem

We have already referred to the police as one of the main bulwarks of a democracy. As such, the importance of keeping the executive from arbitrarily interfering in their duties goes without saying, but arbitrary interference by the executive unfortunately has become rather the norm than the exception since Sri Lanka gained independence. Much has been written about the genealogy of this malady with regard to the public service. The general view of such writers as Gunnar Myrdal and Niel Fernando is that constant political interference and attacks have contributed to the reduction of the effectiveness of the public bureaucracy and the weakening of its morale. The police have not been left untouched by this general malady.

The Daily News in an editorial in 1982 said that the demoralising effect of political pressure under government after government has eroded the authority of every division of the police. There was a time when at least one superintendent of police declared in exasperation that the IGP in Colombo may be his boss but that he had to take orders from his member of Parliament (MP).

The Basnayake Police Commission as far back as 1970 went to great length in analysing the problems confronting the police and even produced a completely reoriented Police Act to rectify the many shortcomings in the Police Ordinance of 1865. The commission said that a prerequisite to the efficient maintenance of law and order by the police is non-interference with the performance of their duties. The members of the police should have the freedom of discharging their duties without the fear of pressure from outside forces.

They said that available evidence suggested that there was political interference in appointments and promotions. Such interference affects the independence of the members of the police and the impartial discharge of their duties. They further said that such interference would also induce members of the police force to invoke the aid on their behalf of the politicians whom they oblige and pointed to evidence that disclosed several known instances where members of the police department invoked the aid of politicians. This behaviour, they said, undermines the morale of the police.

The Jayasinghe Committee, which was appointed by the government in 1995 to investigate and report on the reorganisation of the police force, confirmed what the Basnayake Commission uncovered in 1970. The committee, led by W. T. Jayasinghe, a former secretary to the Ministry of Defence, stated that all of the officers who appeared before them agreed that undue pressure was brought to bear regarding appointments, promotions, postings and even transfers. These undue pressures were mostly from politicians and those close to politicians. They also agreed that this was one of the primary reasons for the breakdown of discipline, the loss of morale and the high incidence of corruption in the police force.

Remedies

Remedies were suggested as far back as 1970. In fact, it is the Basnayake Police Commission that year that recommended for the first time the establishment of a Police Service Commission to control the police force as one of the remedies to the country's law enforcement problems. The commission, having considered the vulnerability of the police to political pressure as one of the major hindrances to their efficiency and effectiveness, made two specific recommendations. One was the creation of a special commission to be known as the Police Service Commission to deal with appointments, transfers, promotions and the disciplinary control of the police force. The second was steps to be taken to secure the tenure of the office of the IGP.

Commenting about the position held by the IGP, the commission said that "today the IGP is in the same position as any other public servant in regard to his liability to be retired from the public service. This is in spite of the fact that there is no other public servant that is called upon to bear so great a responsibility as the IGP is." The commission further said that an IGP who has reached the age of optional retirement or who has only a few years to reach that age is haunted by the fear that if he does not please those in power he may be forced to retire either at once or the moment he reaches the age of optional retirement. That such fears should haunt the head of so important a department in the performance of his very responsible duties, they said, is not in the public interest. Therefore, they recommended that the head of the police should be suitably protected against the irresponsible exercise of the power of removal.

Quoting the example of the immunity enjoyed by the judges of the Supreme Court, the auditor general and the commissioner of elections, they provided in their draft Police Act that the head of the police cannot be removed, except for proved misconduct, and then only after a resolution by both houses of Parliament has been passed and tendered to the governor general. Thus, they felt that the appointment of a Police Service Commission, coupled with the provision that the head of the police should not be removable, except for proved misconduct and then only after a resolution of both houses of Parliament, could go a long way in securing that objective. The Subasinghe Committee in 1979 made similar or even more far-reaching recommendations and proposed the elevation of the head of the police department to the status of the secretary of a ministry with safeguards concerning the tenure of his office.

Even the Jayasinghe Committee in 1995 endorsed these views. Tracing the circumstances that led to the development of a sensitive relationship between the police and the MP of the ruling party, the committee pointed out the dilemma that every government had to face as a result. They said that in this situation it would greatly help the government itself if a Police Service Commission were established as was first recommended by the Basnayake Commission in 1970. Almost all of the officers who appeared before the committee were vehemently in support of this proposal. On the one hand, the establishment of such a commission, they said, would give relief to the government in dealing with the complaints now made by MPs. On the other hand, it would go a long way to restore the morale and confidence in the police force itself.

Hence, several police commissions appointed in the past have dwelt with these questions and have made recommendations. While some recommendations have received the attention of the government, those crucial to the effectiveness of the police have remained either neglected or ignored. It is, therefore, not surprising that political interference has continued regardless of the recommendations of the commissions. What are at stake are the democratic rights of the citizens. The danger is self-evident.

Looking Beyond

It is true enough that an IGP who is given a contract that is renewable every year will be haunted by the fear of the threat of retirement. It is not unusual, therefore, for him to be inclined to secure his position by pleasing those in power, but recent experience has shown that this argument is somewhat flawed in the present context, considering the tendency some incumbents have shown to overreach themselves to secure their position even after reaching the age of retirement so that they can continue to remain in office. The temptation, not only to prolong his stay in office as long as possible, but also to try and secure high office even thereafter, has been reinforced by the recent practice of governments offering prestigious postings abroad to retiring IGPs. This encourages a "you-scratch-my-back-and-I-scratch-yours" kind of attitude. The remedy, therefore, may lie in the appointment of the IGP for a fixed contract, say for three or four years, with a retirement package that will enable him to live comfortably without the lure of ambassadorial postings or other high offices and to do his duty for the people.

These suggestions, however, are safeguards against an IGP in office. What are the safeguards against the chances of an unscrupulous aspirant getting into office through political lobbying? This issue has often remained an open question and will probably remain so until the next IGP sweepstakes. Consequently, safeguards have to be built, not only against undue political pressure on the incumbent IGP, but also against aspirants from getting to the top post through political lobbying. These are realities that cannot be ignored considering the precedents set in the past. This is the stage at which safeguards are necessary most, more so than at any other time. All other safeguards that have been proposed would be for naught; for having secured the post after lobbying, it will be natural for the incumbent to feel obliged to his political godfathers, howsoever secure he is in his office.

Thus, when we are discussing the ways and means of building public confidence in the police, what should be uppermost in our minds is not only an independent police commission but also an independent head of the police who can, by the circumstances of his appointment alone, infuse confidence among the public. Selection procedures that are transparent enough to infuse public confidence in the appointment of the IGP have to be put in place in the future towards this end without delay. Therefore, the need of the hour is not to rush with deadlines for reasons of expediency but to study the problem in depth and bring meaningful reforms that will restore public confidence in the police, in due process and in democracy.

If the concern for an independent police commission is to give the public a fair deal, then let us let them know what this independent police commission is all about. Appoint a police commission to go into all aspects of policing - no police commission has sat publicly for nearly three decades. The Basnayake Police Commission was the last police commission that had public hearings. Before that, it was the Soertz Police Commission. There are many issues concerning the police to be publicly debated. Let the public make their views known, and let them decide what is good for them. If we have had to put up with the police without an independent police commission for 30 years only to be awakened to the recommendations of the Basnayake Police Commission now, why not wait for a little longer until we re-examine all of the issues concerning the police thoroughly without rushing to do ad hoc, haphazard work.