by Yash Ghai

(Ed. note: The author is the Sir Y. K. Pao Professor of Public Law at the University of Hong Kong and an advisor to the Asian Human Rights Commission [AHRC]. The article below will appear in an upcoming book published by Curzon Press - Asian Values: Encounter with Diversity - edited by Josiane Cauqelin, Birgit Mayer Koenig and Paul Lim. The article was commissioned by the European Institute for Asian Studies [EIAS] in Brussels, Belgium, for a study entitled "Understanding Asian Values.")

"The rich man in his castle,
The poor man at his gate,
God made the high and the lowly
And ordered their estate"
(All Things Right and Beautiful, a Christian hymn).

"Duke Ching of Ch’i asked Master K’ung about government. Master K’ung replied saying, ‘Let the prince be a prince, the minister a minister, the father a father and the son a son’" (Analects 12.11).

"The system of caste insists that the law of social life should not be cold and cruel competition but harmony and cooperation. . . . A man born in a particular group is trained to its manner and will find it extremely hard to adjust himself to a new way. . . . The worker has the fulfilment of his being through and in his work. According to the Bhagavadgita, one obtains perfection if one does one’s duty in the proper spirit of non-attachment" (S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life, p. 112).

Introduction

In this article, I discuss notions of rights, duties and responsibilities in the context of the contemporary debates about Asian values. The rise of "Asian values" as a political doctrine can be traced to the end of the Cold War. Its most active proponents were Singapore and Malaysia. It came into prominence to challenge what was claimed to be the attempts of the West to establish its global intellectual and cultural hegemony by imposing Western notions of rights under the guise of their universalism. Before the collapse of Western communist regimes, the discourse on rights was dominated by the great ideological differences between liberal capitalism and socialism in which the contest was seen to lie in the competing claims of the primacy of civil and political rights, on one hand, and economic and social rights, on the other. The West was deemed to conceive of rights largely as political while the socialist States provided the impetus for social and economic rights. At the heart of the controversy was the role of the market in the organization of the economy and the distribution of resources. Socialist States not only deployed the well-known critique by Marx of what he called bourgeois rights but also claimed to have established a better framework for rights in which economic and social rights were ensured to all people, enabling them to live a life of dignity. Socialist States, therefore, analyzed rights in class terms. The leaders of developing States hovered uneasily between these opposing views as they were reluctant to disengage from the rhetoric of rights which had been invoked extensively in the colonial period, but they were also conscious of the difficulties of establishing their political authority, especially in multiethnic societies, and were increasingly driven to a restrictions of rights. In this context, "developmentalism" became an ideology of sorts for both socialist regimes and those which operated market economies under the hegemony of the West with its undertones of control and authority.

The collapse of communist regimes in Europe and the end of the Cold War changed dramatically the context for the discourse of human rights. The discourse achieved a high salience. The collapse of communism was widely represented as the victory of human rights and democracy. The West defined its mission as the extension of rights and democracy to other parts of the world. It was no longer encumbered by the need to placate and boost its former authoritarian allies as part of its strategy to fight communism worldwide and was able to respond to its own publics who had begun to question the assumptions and practices of foreign aid. Human rights- and democracy-based conditionalities began to be imposed on foreign aid and trade relations, resulting in massive structural adjustments and the opening up of Third World economies to international investment and markets. Human rights and democracy seemed to provide the framework for the reconstitution of the former Soviet Union and other States in Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia (despite, perhaps because of, all the carnage), that was evident in the rules enunciated by the European Union (EU) for the recognition of its breakaway republics. Earlier a similar framework had justified international intervention in Cambodia for its reconstruction (even if it did not facilitate the reconstruction), and today U.N. interventions, whether in Somalia, Rwanda or Zaire, are routinely justified on human rights and humanitarian grounds.

The emphasis on rights was not welcomed by all States, however. Those States which had felt immune from international scrutiny of their authoritarian political systems (which in East and Southeast Asia had been justified on the basis of the menace of communism) found themselves a little like the emperor without clothes. They were anxious at what were considered to be the likely consequences of this new stress on human rights for their political systems. They were also resentful of conditionalities that derogated from their political and economic sovereignty. The universalization of rights was seen as the imposition of Western cultural norms. They were anxious because of the effects of these rights on their competitiveness in the framework of international trade that was ushered in by globalization, and they claimed to detect in this emphasis a Western conspiracy to undermine newly growing economies.

The challenge to the new emphasis on rights and democracy was, paradoxically, led by States in East and Southeast Asia which by many standards were unlikely candidates. They were unlikely candidates because they shared a wide set of interests with the West, especially the United States. They were also well-integrated into the global economy, and there was a large consensus among them on the market mechanism. Moreover, they needed Western capital and technology; they were not directly affected by earlier phases of conditionality and structural adjustment; they had close common interests in the security of the region under the umbrella of the United States; and they were heavy purchasers of Western weaponry.

There were two factors which prompted them, however, to lead the resistance to attempts at the universalization of human rights. First, their special client relationship with the West was in jeopardy in the new period of post-Cold War geo-politics and with this the consequent vulnerability of their regimes to human rights-based criticism. Second, while they were integrated into the global economic system, their versions of the market were less than liberal with there being a complex (if not necessarily subtle) set of connections between the State and the market which gave governments considerable leverage over economic (and consequently political) processes. Implicit in the concept of governance was a different version of the market and a new framework for international economic competition, which was likely to have relatively greater effect on States already well-integrated into the global economy. Above all else, however, these States were well-placed to challenge what they saw as Western pretensions. They had achieved remarkable economic development in the preceding decades and a measure of social and political stability. Moreover, if they were dependent on the West, they also offered attractive conditions for Western capital and markets, ruling out significant Western retaliation.

The wide consensus on the market and global economic processes that they shared with the West determined the specific nature of their challenge to the rights regime - the claim of cultural specificity of rights. There was also a subsidiary riposte based on that old-fashioned artefact of Western statecraft and international relations - sovereignty.

In the positioning preceding the Vienna Conference on Human Rights (orchestrated largely by Singapore and Malaysia), China was ambivalent about the cultural response, having denounced Confucianism only a few years earlier. China’s opposition (as in the White Paper of 1991, Human Rights in China, issued by the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China [PRC]) was based on materialist rather than cultural grounds. It said that "the evolution of the situation in regard to human rights is circumscribed by the historical, social, economic and cultural conditions of various nations and involves a process of historical development." Because of these reasons, "countries differ in their understanding and practice of human rights" (both quotations are from page 2 of the document). The same position is repeated in an update of that paper issued in December 1995 (despite some attempts at the revival of Confucian thought in China). Although in one sense China argues for the primacy of rights related to basic, physical needs, its position is that China has protected civil and political rights as effectively as these. China’s principal position is that rights are essentially domestic matters within state sovereignty and are not subject to international interference. Only with strong sovereignty can a State protect the rights of its citizens (for which the predations against China by the West in the 19th century might be seen to provide enough justification).

Although some other East and Southeast Asian States subscribe to this theory of sovereignty (and, thus, deny the responsibility of the international community for the protection of human rights), their principal response has been cultural. It involves a direct attack on the claim of the universality of human rights. It has opposed "Western" rights with "Asian values." What is more, it has claimed that the economic and social success of Asia was based on these values and that the economic crisis and moral decadence of the West was the result of its preoccupation with rights.

Moreover, they add, there were antecedents for this cultural perspective. For example, an early challenge to universalism came from certain members of Islamic societies, especially in the Middle East in the wake of the defeat of the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli war. The defeat was ascribed by some to the creeping Westernization of their States and societies; a return to Islamic values was the prescription (Nasr, 1987, especially Chapter 5; Mayer, 1995, especially Chapter 2). The rise of the Islamic movement put a stop in many countries to the reform (i.e., the modernization) of the law as the new laws, especially in the area of family, were seen as contrary to the Sharia law of Islam.

Western preoccupation with Asian economic success and the distinctiveness of its culture was given an impetus by the well-known article by Samuel Huntington where he states that the next major global conflict would be between civilizations or cultures, not ideologies (Huntington, 1993). Although the article is weak both theoretically and empirically, it has been highly influential and has moulded U.S. foreign policy and given rise to the notion that cultures are both different and antagonistic. As with "Asian values," it seeks to fill the void left by the Cold War, to sharpen differences with others, to "enjoy" them as enemies.

There is no particular coherence in the doctrine of Asian values though. Its intellectual roots are weak, and it shifts its ground as expediency demands. Although perceived and intended to be an attack on human rights, it is, in fact, concerned with ethics and the organization of society and does not engage directly with the nature of human rights. Moreover, it sets up false polarities and has a dubious theory of causation with which it seeks to attack the notion of rights.

The doctrine of Asian values seeks to achieve various objectives, however. It seeks to differentiate Asia from the West and, indeed, to show the superiority of the former over the latter. Through this differentiation, it seeks to disapply norms of rights and democracy. It aims to fight the gospel of governance by "demonstrating" the distinct cultural foundations of Asian capitalism and markets which, unlike in the West, are not dependent on legal norms and independent judiciaries but rather on the ties of family and kinship (and the trust they generate) (Redding, 1990; Hamilton, 1991; Wong, 1991). It aims to strengthen Asian solidarity by positing (a false) unity.1

An argument which seeks to establish the essential difference between the East and the West is the relative importance of rights and duties in the two cultures. In brief, the argument is that the West emphasizes rights and the East stresses duties. Various consequences are then drawn from this distinction as regards the atomization of society (when rights-based) or its solidarity (when duty-based). Rights-based regimes are said to promote confrontation and conflict while duty-based regimes are said to advance harmony and consensus. In a duty-based regime, a person relates to the family and the community in a different way than in a rights-based regime; the former linking the individual to society in a more organic manner than in the latter. In the contemporary discourse of some Asian governments, the decadence and moral decay in the West is due to its obsession with rights while the social and political stability in Asia (more precisely East Asia) is due to its cultivation of a sense of duty. These views are expressed not only by government leaders who have a political axe to grind but also by thoughtful Asians. For example, Prof. Onuma has argued that the abuse of power by the ruler and the violation of values and interests of the people have been checked not by judicial mechanisms but by the virtue of the rule and wisdom and prudence of the elite in securing humane and good governance (1996, p. 3).

I propose to take up this debate by examining such questions as the moral or material basis of duties and rights, the consequences of a duty-based regime and contemporary circumstances that bear on them.

The Virtues of Duties

Duties are frequently understood as correlatives of rights. My right to privacy becomes your duty to respect it. In that sense, the notion of duty serves no additional purpose, except to give precision to the notion of right (right to what? right against whom? what redress? - a concern essentially of lawyers, who find it conceptually impossible to think of rights without duties). As White says, "Bentham and others ... argued that since, in their view, rights and duties are correlative the idea of a right could be regarded as superfluous and all the necessary work done by the idea of duty." Historically, White argues that the notion of duty, encapsulated in the term "officium," is much older than the notion of right.

It is unnecessary for our purposes to enter into a philosophical inquiry into the relations between right and duty, which are complex and ever-changing as new forms of entitlements are being established. What I seek to examine are duties in a more abstract sense as in claims that, while the West emphasizes rights, the East emphasizes duties and that duties provide a better way to organize society than rights. In this sense, duties are not merely correlatives of rights. An Indian scholar has put the matter in this way: "Indians . . . base their social structure on duties and obligations rather than on rights." Persons are seen not first and by nature as bearers of rights but rather as bearers of duties (Saksena, 1967, p. 372). When invited by UNESCO to contribute to a symposium on human rights, Mahatma Gandhi wrote back that "all rights to be deserved and preserved come from duty well-done" (1947).

The essence of this claim is also illustrated by the following quotation from Soedjatmoko:

"We should not forget that many of the traditional cultures have not felt the need to make individuation and human freedom explicit values in their own perception of their culture. The viability and cohesiveness of these societies are derived from a closely knit texture of mutual obligations rather than from the human individual and his rights. Thus, there are many societies where individual rights are not likely to be the focal point in the value of configuration. Many of the more primitive societies are collective societies whereas part of the modernization process rests on individualization and greater awareness of the rights of the person. Still, collective societies have not precluded the possibility of the self-realization of the individual. Rather, this self-realization takes place in the context of the moral fabric of the society and in the web of obligations towards the community rather than primarily in the context of rights. Moreover, all these societies do recognize and value the dignity of the human person, and they all have developed sensitivity and forms of social intercourse for careful preservation and observance of it" (1985, pp. 76-77).

A vivid illustration of the same point is presented in that minor classic The Hindu View of Life by the eminent philosopher and former president of India, Radhakrishnan, in his defence of the Hindu caste system. Referring to the stratification involved in caste, he wrote the following:

"Caste on its social side is a product of human organization and not a mystery of divine appointment. It is an attempt to regulate society with a view to actual differences and ideal unity. The first reference to it is in the Purusa Sukta where the different sections of society are regarded as the limbs of the great self. Human society is an organic whole, the parts of which are naturally dependent in such a way that each part in fulfilling its distinctive functions conditions the fulfilment of functions by the rest and is, in turn, conditioned by the fulfilment of its function by the rest. In this sense, the whole is presented in each part while each part is indispensable to the whole. Every society consists of groups working for the fulfilment of the wants of society. As the different groups work for a common end, they are bound by a sense of unity and social brotherhood. The cultural and the spiritual, the military and the political, the economic classes and the unskilled workers constitute the fourfold caste organization. The different functions of human life were clearly separated, and their specific and complementary character was recognized. Each caste had its social purpose and function, its own code and tradition. It is a close corporation equipped with a certain traditional and independent organization, observing certain usages regarding food and marriage. Each group is free to pursue its own aims free from interference by others. The functions of different castes were regarded as equally important to the well-being of the whole. The serenity of the teacher, the heroism of the warrior, the honesty of the business man and the patience and energy of the worker all contribute to social growth. Each has its own perfection" (1927, pp. 107-108; italics supplied).

Although Confucianism is less bound by rigid caste distinctions which prevent mobility, a similar reasoning underlies the five key relationships in its thought - ruler-subject, father-son, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother and friend-friend - as well as the four social classes - the scholars, farmers, soldiers and merchants (with the first not much different from the Brahmin, although the last are not quite outcastes).2 Accordingly, the role of each person was defined precisely, and the rites appropriate to that role were carefully set out. There is a similar sense that social harmony and personal satisfaction derive from the perfect performance of one’s role (as in the quotation from the Analects at the top of this article). Hsieh Yu-wei, while acknowledging the presence of the notion of rights in Confucianism, summarizes the position as follows:

"But it was not the rights of the individual that were considered most important. Of most importance were the duties or obligations of the individual. According to Confucian ethics, in order to be a man or to be a sage, it is necessary, first, to perform one’s duties, not to claim one’s rights" (1967, p. 314).

The Nature of a Duty-Based Society

It is now time to draw the implications of the notion of duty. The first point is that the concept is not used in this context to show that duty is a correlative of right, although some duties may, indeed, be a response to the rights of another. It is more like a case of duty without rights. In this sense, it is more like responsibilities, the sense of right and proper conduct. Many duties mentioned in Confucian and Hindu thought are rooted in morality, not legal obligations, nor are duties a method of prescription of a subject’s relationship with the State alone; they are deeply embedded in social and familial relationships also, providing a structure for all of society. The ambit of duties is therefore wider than that of rights.3 There are several dimensions of such a notion.

(a) First, that the members of a society based on duties may be said to be less selfish than in a society which is rights-based.

(b) Secondly (related to the preceding point), it is sometimes claimed that a society based on duties is communitarian while a rights-based society is individualistic; in the former, the individual is subordinate to and subsumed under the family and society.4

(c) Thirdly, it may be said that a duty-based society is more oriented towards harmony and stability than conflict; for while assertions of rights are adversarial and confrontationalist, the performance of duty is based on cooperation and the acceptance of obligations, and thus, it may be claimed that a duty-based society is civil and values courteous behaviour. The key duties are loyalty, obedience, filial piety, respect and protection.

(d) Fourthly, it is argued that the tendency in a rights-based society is towards formalism, the transformation of values as legal rights. Based on a theory of competition and suspicion of authority, this leads to demands rather than concessions, to confrontation rather than reciprocity and accommodation. An emphasis on duties, on the other hand, leads to honour and peace as well as stability. It is argued that the rights-based emphasis leads to the impoverishment of society so that, in the search for the protection of the citizen against the State, the community collapses and non-state actors become the principal source of oppression and insecurity (making it unsafe to be on the streets of major metropolises after sunset). There is also the danger in the formalization of values as "rights" that the form may elude substance (so that the satisfaction of formal criteria hides realities that deny the values; as Prof. Mazrui once said, the West may have abolished child marriages, but the number of teenage pregnancies has vastly increased). From this perspective, the role of duty is particularly important in civil society, and indeed, the notion of duty finds its strongest application in the family, particularly in the Confucian tradition.

(e) Fifthly, it is assumed that true happiness lies in the fulfilment of duty. I have already referred to assertions to the effect that "perfection lies in duty." Seen in this way, duty is infinitely superior to rights.

(f) Sixthly, it is said that the real protection of subjects lies in the duties that are imposed on the rulers. Confucianism is particularly strong on this point. The ruler must act benevolently. One of the clearest examples of this appears in Analects 2.20:

"Chi K’aang-tzu asked about inducing the people to be respectful and loyal so that they might be encouraged to support him. The Master said, ‘If you approach them with dignity, they will respect you. If you are dutiful towards your parents and kind to your children, then they will be loyal. If you promote the good and instruct the incompetent, then they will be encouraged.’"5

The State is thus to be patterned on the family with the monarch acting as the kind father to his subjects who reciprocate with filial piety and loyalty. In Confucian society, leaders were expected to lead by example, by virtue and morality. Unless they did that, they were likely to forfeit the Mandate of Heaven, which was their authority to rule, and the people then might overthrow the regime. It has been said that the fear of the loss of the mandate acted as a powerful deterrent through the centuries against despotic rule.

Stated in this way, a duty-based society is particularly attractive. However, to provide a balanced picture of a duty-based society, it is necessary to set it in a historical and comparative context.

(a) First, it is necessary to dispel the notion that a duty- and rights-based distinction can serve as a useful basis for distinguishing Eastern from Western societies. Societies in most continents have passed through a duty-based, communitarian period. Some of the most sophisticated dissertations on the virtue of duty, in fact, come from the West. The change from the primacy of duty to the primacy of rights comes about as the political relationship between the rulers and the ruled change. In a despotic regime, the duties of the subject are emphasized; in a democratic society, the rights of citizens are emphasized (Bobbio, 1996, pp. 38-43). Rights, therefore, are concerned with political relationships and have been intimately connected with the rise of centralized States (for an essay delineating the subtle and varied connections between rights, duties and powers and the changing political configurations for their juxtaposition in China, see Wang, 1980). Before the advent of colonialism in Asia, the structures of political authority were fluid; boundaries of the domain of a ruler fluctuated with the rise and ebb of his power; and the State made little pretence of regulating the life of its subjects (Tambiah, 1992; Nissan and Stirrat, 1990). Colonialism, however, produced highly centralized and authoritarian state systems which became the legacy of nationalist leaders at independence. In most cases after independence, the settlement of these issues was based on a balance between the rulers and the ruled that was mediated principally through the medium of human rights.

(b) Secondly, the fact that the West has formalized rights and strengthened the legal machinery for their enforcement does not make it either adversarial or individualistic. An attempt to assert a right is not a challenge to society. The person asserting a right does not set herself or himself in opposition to society. Instead, she or he seeks a confirmation of community and national values. The fact that public challenges to the administration are allowed in the courts and other forums is merely evidence of the cohesiveness, strength and stability of the community and the nation. The occasions when it is necessary to resort to the courts to enforce rights are relatively few. This is because there are relatively few serious violations of rights; and when there are, their redress is achieved in non-judicial ways. For the most part, political processes in the West are far more consensual than in the East where there is considerable reliance on coercion and the suppression of free speech. It is particularly ironic that despotic leaders should accuse democracies where the governments are elected by the people and are responsive to them of being adversarial with people pitted against the government.

(c) Thirdly, duty-based societies have historically been status-based and hierarchical. Several consequences follow.

(i) First, duties are not equally distributed but depend on one’s status. Thus, the duties of the father are different from the son, those of the wife different from the husband, of a Brahmin different from a Sudra. There is no concept of equal duties. In most such systems, the position of women is particularly inferior. Manu reminds us in his laws:

"By a girl, by a young woman, or even by an aged one, nothing must be done independently, even in her own house. In childhood, a female must be subject to her father, in youth to her husband, when her lord is dead to her sons: a woman must never be independent" (V:147, Doniger and Smith, 1991, p. 115).6

(ii) Two, duties are to preserve hierarchies and to ensure obedience for the purposes of stability. The emphasis on the family itself serves to protect the State.

When asked why he was not in the public service, Confucius replied, "Be filial, only be filial and friendly towards your brothers, and you will be contributing to government. There are other sorts of service quite different from what you mean by service" (Analects 2.21). This has been interpreted to mean a virtuous private life makes a real contribution towards public welfare or the stability of government (Waley, 1989, p. 93). Master Yu, for example, is quoted as having said: "Those who in private life behave well towards their parents and elder brothers, in public life, seldom show a disposition to resist the authority of their superiors; and as for such men starting a revolution, no instance of it has ever occurred" (Analects 1.2).

For the same reason, the behaviour of groups and individuals are prescribed in great detail, often connected with rituals to impart to them a sense of the sacred. Confucius, emphasizing the extreme importance of rites, sets out in elaborate detail the ritual appropriate to different occasions and persons. Dr. Radhakrishnan also reminds us how Hinduism regulates the most intimate details of daily life (p. 80).

The careful ascription of duties to specific persons reinforces status, office and hierarchy as is evident from the well-known Confucian story about the emperor who, fatigued by his journey or drink, fell asleep while resting. In the story, the minister of hats, passing by, took the emperor’s robe that was lying nearby and covered the emperor with it. Upon waking up, the emperor was touched to see the robe over him and enquired as to who had been so kind as to place the robe over him. However, on being told that it was the minister of hats, he was extremely angry with him for exceeding his duty, which had little to do with robes, and equally angry with the minister of robes for neglecting his duty!

(iii) The constant emphasis on the imperative of duty, on its glorification, on how true fulfilment lies in the perfect discharge of duty, etc., serve to enhance the ideology of obedience and subservience. Indeed, it is the force of this ideological indoctrination that continues to cause unease among the people about a challenge to the system that oppresses them. The purveyors of this ideology are, not surprising, the scholar-bureaucrats (in Confucianism) and the high caste (in Hinduism), the principal beneficiaries and intellectuals of the respective systems.

The Contemporary Relevance of the Notion of Duties

Some contemporary presentations of "Asian values" assume that the notion of duties outlined above still pervade Asia. Quite apart from the fact that even in ancient times "duties," particularly those applied to rulers, did not operate in the idealized versions of Confucius and Manu, it would be surprising if they were to be the defining characteristics of Asian societies today. Indeed, the vigour with which Confucianism is presented today as the specificity which distinguishes the East from the West itself suggests that it may not be well or alive. Certainly the social foundations of Confucianism, structured around agrarian relations, have been altered beyond recognition nor are the values that it extolled consistent with the style of governance or economy today. Asian values are used to explain economic success, yet Confucianism and Hinduism are both opposed to the profit motive and the accumulation of wealth. Persons most revered in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore today are those with wealth and business empires.7 If the social foundations of the old system have disappeared, why do the governments of these countries harp upon the notion of duties that were connected to them?

There would appear to be several reasons for this preoccupation with duties (for a detailed exposition, see Ghai, 1994). One is to provide a counterpoint to the West, to ward off real or imagined pressures for democratization and human rights, providing an intellectual justification for different moral standards. The second is connected with the original ideological purpose of the concept of duty, that of obedience and subservience. It serves to downgrade rights, which are the vehicles of protest and the justification for equality and justice. Nowhere is this more evident than in Singapore where the government is cultivating an ideology with remarkable resemblance to Confucianism - minus the exemplary behaviour of the leaders.

That the contemporary celebrations of the concept of duty have little to do with culture and much to do with politics is evident from various contradictions of policies and practices of governments most heavily engaged in its exhortation. I will take three examples to illustrate my point.

As already noted, these governments claim that their societies place a higher value on the community than in the West, that individuals find fulfilment in their participation in communal life and community tasks and that this factor constitutes a primary distinction in the approach to human rights. The Western preoccupation with individualism is explained by the alienation resulting from its economic system which has sapped the vitality of the community and has forced introspection on individuals as a means towards their identity. This argument is advanced as an instance of the general proposition that rights are culture-specific.

The "communitarian" argument is Janus-faced. It is used against the claim of universal human rights to distinguish the allegedly Western, individual-oriented approaches to rights from the community-centred values of the East. Yet it is also used to deny the claims and assertions of communities in the name of "national unity and stability." It suffers from at least two further weaknesses. First, it overstates the "individualism" of Western society and traditions of thought. Even within Western liberalism, there are strands of analysis which assert claims of the community (for example, Rousseau), and most Western human rights instruments allow limitations on and deviations from human rights in the public interest or for reasons of state. Western courts regularly engage in the task of balancing the respective interests of the individual and the community. Within liberal societies, there are nuances in the approach to and the primacy of human rights as becomes evident when one examines the differences among the United States, Canada, France and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, liberalism does not exhaust Western political thought or practice. There is social democracy, which emphasizes collective and economic rights; Marxism, which elevates the community to a high moral order, is also reflective of an important school of Western thought. Moreover, there is much celebration in Western political thought of "civil society," a personification of the community, standing between the State and the individual and family (Cohen and Arato, 1992).

Secondly, Asian governments fall into the easy, but wrong, assumption that they or the State are the "community."8 Nothing can be more destructive of the community than this understanding. The community and State are different institutions and, to some extent, in a contrary juxtaposition. The community, for the most part, depends on popular norms developed through forms of consensus that are enforced through mediation and persuasion. The State is an imposition on society; and unless humanized and democratized (as it has not been in most of Asia), it relies on edicts, the military, coercion and sanctions. It is the tension between them which has elsewhere underpinned human rights. In the name of the community, most Asian governments have stifled social and political initiatives of private groups. Most of them have draconian legislation, like the colonially inspired Societies Act under British rule,9 which gives the government pervasive control over civil society. Similarly, rights to assemble and march peacefully have been mortgaged to the government. Governments have destroyed many communities in the name of development or state stability, and the consistent refusal of most of them to recognize that there are indigenous peoples among their population (who have a right to preserve their traditional culture, economy and beliefs) is but a demonstration of their lack of commitment to the real community. The vitality of the community comes from the exercise of the rights to organize, meet, debate and protest, which are dismissed as "liberal" rights by these governments. Furthermore, the tight regulation of society as practised in China and Singapore is not particularly Confucian. Confucius argued against reliance on law or coercion and advocated a government of limited powers and functions.10

Another attack on the community comes from the economic, market-oriented policies of governments. Although Asian capitalism appears to rely on family and clan associations, there is little doubt that it weakens the community and its cohesion. The organizing matrix of the market is not the same as that of the community nor are its values or methods particularly "communitarian." The moving frontier of the market, seeking new resources, has been particularly disruptive of communities which have managed to preserve intact a great deal of their culture and organization during the colonial and postcolonial periods. The emphasis on the market and with it individual rights of property are also at odds with communal organization and the enjoyment of property (and a further irony is that Asian leaders who allege their allegiance to communal supremacy and values are among the most ardent opponents of a Marxism that espouses the moral worth and authority of the community). Market policies have relied greatly on multinational capital and corporations, which have brought new values and tastes, and are increasingly integrating their economies and elites into a global economy and culture. Indeed, it is these very considerations which prompted the Singapore government to undertake the propagation of an official ideology patently based on Confucianism (even if that required the assistance of foreign experts!, Kuo, 1996), but the contradictions of official policies have largely escaped its authors. It has totally ignored the impact - indeed, the onslaught - of modern technologies on traditional communities. Capitalism in Asia (and Asian capitalism overseas) tends to be extremely predatory, often disregarding industrial safety standards, and is marked by a high degree of exploitation of both labour and the environment. It is certainly not driven by any sense of duty!

A final point is the contradiction between claims of a harmonious society that promotes decision making by consensus and the extensive arming of the state apparatus. The pervasive use of draconian measures, like administrative detentions, the disestablishment of societies, press censorship, sedition laws, etc., belie claims to respect alternative views, promote dialogue and seek consensus. The contemporary state intolerance of opposition is inconsistent with traditional communal values and processes. Contemporary state processes in Asia are less hospitable to community politics than the much-derided adversarial processes of the West, which at least ensure a hearing for all parties.

Conclusion

I have argued in this article that a duty-based society has traditionally been status-oriented and hierarchical. I do not wish to contend against a broader notion of duty in the sense of responsibilities or civic virtue. There is clearly much that is attractive in people who are mindful of the concerns of others, who wish to contribute to the welfare of the community, who place society above their own personal interests. No civilized society is possible without such people. There is also much that is attractive in societies that seek a balance between rights and responsibilities and emphasize harmony. Moreover, I do not wish to underestimate the potential of the concept of duty as a safeguard against the abuse of power or office. I am much attracted to the notion of the withdrawal of the Mandate of Heaven from rulers who transgress upon their duties as rulers (although I am also aware that this was largely impotent as a responsive or accountable device or discipline on rulers). My arguments have been addressed here to the pretensions of some governments which have advanced claims of moral superiority of their societies and their assertions of Asian values. It will be obvious that I am unimpressed by these claims and wish to expose their dissembling qualities.

However, it would be unfortunate if the disquiet with these strategies were to obscure the interesting new explorations of the notion of duty and self-cultivation in Confucian studies which seek to demonstrate that the balance between the individual and the community is not what it has often been presented to be - a subordination of the individual in and to the community - but rather it is a recognition of the importance of the individual (Hsieh; Tu Wei-ming) nor that Confucianism, with its emphasis on the family, failed to develop a proper civic sense (De Bary), the results of which are too obvious in the corruption of public life in so many Asian States where the notion of duty barely extends beyond the family and the clan. It would be equally unfortunate if rights were seen as an antagonist to a well-functioning and caring society in which there is a strong sense of responsibility and obligation (as appears to be sometimes the perception in the West today). With rights, we deal essentially with the State; with obligations, we deal with fellow human beings and the society they constitute. There are, of course, many points of interaction between the State and society when rights and duties in the senses used here may conflict, but the regime of rights provides the machinery to strike appropriate balances.

Endnotes

1. For two clear but extreme versions of this approach, see B. Kausikan, "Asia’s Different Standard," Foreign Policy, Vol. 29 (1993), pp. 24-41 and F. Zakaria, "Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73 No. 2 (1994), pp. 109-126.

2. For an interesting (but to my mind unsuccessful) attempt to defend the obviously confining circumstances of filial piety in terms of humanity, self-cultivation, reciprocity and example, see Tu Wei-ming (1985).

3. These points are well-illustrated by this cable from Mahatma Gandhi to H. G. Wells who sent him draft articles on human rights:

"Received your cable. Have carefully read your five articles. You will permit me to say you are on the wrong track. I feel sure that I can draw up a better Charter of Rights than you have drawn up, but of what good will it be? Who will become its guardian? If you mean propaganda or popular education, you have begun at the wrong end. I suggest the right way. Begin with a Charter of Duties of Man (both D and M capitals), and I promise the rights will follow as spring follows winter. I write from experience. As a young man, I began life by seeking to assert my rights, and I soon discovered that I had none, not even over my wife. So I began by discovering and performing my duty as by my wife, my children, friends, companions and society, and I find today that I have greater rights, perhaps more than any living man I know. If this is too tall a claim, then I do not know anyone who possesses greater rights than I" (Reprinted in Iyer, 1987, p. 492).

4. The surrender of individual desires for the wider interests of the family and society that are so dominant in Confucian thought is somewhat qualified in Hinduism which has deeper spiritual roots. Radha-krishnan quotes a Sanskrit verse: "For the family, sacrifice the individual; for the community, the family; for the country, the community; and for the soul, the whole world" (1927, p. 90).

5. Confucius also said, "Govern the people by regulations; keep order among them by chastisement; and they will flee from you and lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral force; keep order by ritual; and they will keep their self-respect and come to you of their own accord" (Analects 2.3).

6. Manu further states:

"A woman should not try to separate herself from her father, her husband or her sons, for her separation from them would make both (her and her husband’s) families contemptible. She should be always cheerful and clever at household affairs; she should keep her utensils well-polished and not have too free a hand in spending. When her father, or her brother with her father’s permission, gives her to someone, she should obey that man while he is alive and not violate her vow to him when he is dead. . . .

"A virtuous wife should constantly serve her husband like a god, even if he behaves badly, freely indulges his lust and is devoid of any good qualities. . . . It is because a woman obeys her husband that she is exalted in heaven. . . . She should be long-suffering until death, self-restrained and chaste, striving (to fulfil) the unsurpassed duty of women who have one husband" (p. 115).

7. There is no time to go into the debate as to how far the economic success of Southeast and East Asia is due to Asian values or other economic and policy factors. Redding (1990 and 1996) and Hamilton (1991 and 1996) have argued that Confucianism has been fundamental to the development of "Chinese" capitalism, both in terms of motivation and social structure - a viewpoint which has been challenged by, inter alia, John Wong (1996). That at least the answer to the question is not straightforward is provoked by the following considerations: Why is it that Confucianism, which has been around for millennia, should only now be promoting economic growth? Why should it, with its traditional contempt for merchants and profits, become the incubator of capitalism? What about the Catholic Philippines that is now showing signs of rapid economic advancement? How is it that un-Confucian Europe gave birth to capitalism?

8. Although, as I argue, that lip service to the "community" is hypocritical, the real "community" which motivates politicians is parochial and clannish, pursuing its selfish interest at the expense of other communities and is the basis of public corruption and graft - therefore, nothing of which to be proud. An interesting light on "community" occurred in Hong Kong in April 1994 when two shoppers beat up a shop assistant while her colleagues watched but did nothing to defend her. However, she bore no grudge against them, saying, "Even though I have known them for a long time, what difference does it make? You cannot expect someone to help you. I am not their relative" (Eastern Express, 11-12 June 1994). For the role of Confucianism in the family and business, see Lau (1981) and King (1996).

9. Typically such legislation provides that a society has to be registered before it can operate. The government has the discretion to refuse to register a society and to deregister it. It has the power to seek information from the society about its membership, finances and other affairs and to control or prohibit political links with outside bodies.

10.As with religion, Confucianism has been used for political purposes so that its essence has become somewhat obscure. It is undisputed, however, that Confucius was against tough laws and strong punishments, believing instead in the virtue of rulers and their sense of duty. See Rubin, 1976; Van der Sprenkel, 1962; and Tu Wei-ming, 1985.

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