Professor Yash Ghai

(This article was extracted from the Fortnightly Review, Aug 1993, Vol W, Issue 62, published by the Law and Society Trust.)

I. The tide of my talk notwithstanding, there is not one but many Asian perspectives on human rights. It is easy to believe that there is a distinct Asian approach to human rights, because some government leaders speaker as if they present the whole continent when they make their pronouncements on human rights. This view is reinforced because they claim that their views are based on perspectives which emerge from the Asian culture or Asian realities. The gist of their position is that human rights as propounded in the west are founded on individualism and therefore have no relevance to Asia which is based on the primacy of the community. It is also. sometimes argued that economic underdevelopment renders most of the political and civil rights (emphasised in the west) irrelevant in Asia. Indeed, it is sometimes alleged that such rights are dangerous in view of fragmented nationalism and fragile statehood.

It would be surprising if there were one Asian perspective, since neither Asian culture nor Asian realities are homogeneous throughout the continent. All the world's major religions are represented in Asia, and are in one place or another state religions (or enjoy a comparable status: Christianity in the Philippines, Islam in Malaysia, Hinduism in Nepal and Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Thailand). To this list we may add political ideologies like socialism, democracy or feudalism which animate peoples and governments of the region. Even apart from religious differences, there are other factors which have produced a rich diversity of cultures. A culture, moreover, is not static and many accounts given of Asian culture are probably true of an age long ago. Nor are the economic circumstances of all the Asian countries similar. Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong are among the world's most prosperous countries, while there is grinding poverty in Bangladesh, India and the Philippines. The economic and political systems in Asia likewise show a remarkable diversity, ranging from semi-feudal kingdoms in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, through military dictatorships in Burma and Cambodia, effectively one party regimes in Singapore and Indonesia, communist regimes in China and Vietnam, ambiguous democracies in Malaysia and Sri Lanka, to well established democracies like India. There are similarly differences in their economic systems, ranging from tribal subsistence economies in parts of Indonesia through highly developed market economies of Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan and the mixed economy model of India to the planned economies of China and Vietnam. Perceptions of human-rights are undoubtedly reflective of there conditions, and suggest that they would vary from country to country.

Perceptions of human rights are also reflective of social and class positions in society. what conveys an apparent picture of a uniform Asian perspective on human rights is that is the perspective of a particular group, that of the ruling elites which gets international attention. What unites these elites is their notion of governance and expediency of their rule. For the most part the political systems they represent are not open or democratic, and their publicly expressed views on human rights are an emanation of these systems, of the need to justify authoritarianism and repression. It is their views which are given wide publicity domestically and internationally.

There are other Asian voices as well. There are, admittedly somewhat muted or censored, the voices of the oppressed and the marginalised. There are the passionate voices of indigenous peoples whose cultures are destroyed by governments which claim to be the custodians of Asian cultures; they speak in a language which finds few resonances even in the west (because their language is threatening to the system of the market). There is the voice, rising in intensity, of the middle classes, with a stake in affluence whose new found prosperity and economic enterprise shows to them the virtues of the legal protection of property and the rule of law. There are the strident voices of ethnic minorities who seek collective autonomies which challenge the governments' claims of political monopoly and state sovereignty. There are the well modulated voices of the non-governmental organisations, which provide the most consistent and coherent alternative view of human rights to that of governments.

The unity of governments is more apparent than real. Some of the governments which joined in the Bangkok communique in the Asian regional preparatory meeting for the Vienna World Conference on human rights did themselves a disservice, for their domestic record, and their commitment to human rights, is better than one might think from it. India is one example. Along with some other states, it is committed to human rights by its constitutional instruments, has a strong and independent judiciary, and despite problems and setbacks tries hard to maintain human rights. The reason for presenting a united front is not unconnected with a perceived North-South confrontation (as is evident from the Bangkok Governmental Declarati6n, which stressed the need to avoid the application of double standards" in the implementation of human rights and its "politicisation"). Asian governments feel that since the end of the cold war, the west has focused its attention on what it perceives to be the "undemocratic" nature of third world politics. In Africa and Latin America the western concern with human rights is seen to be an instrument for the establishment or strengthening of the market, in an attempt to restrict the interventions of the state in economic relations. In Asia, however, the key economies are heavily market oriented, and for the most part are successful. Even China is now turning to the market, which is widely credited for its economic success. So the emphasis on human rights is not necessary as a spur to the market (and indeed, as I explore later, the relationship between the market and human rights is problematic).

Some Asian' governments consider that the western pressure on them for an improvement in human rights is connected with the project of western global hegemony. This is to be achieved partly through the universalisation of western values and aspirations, and partly through the disorientation of Asian state and political systems (and the consequent negative effect on their burgeoning economies). They have fashioned their response accordingly. There is some danger in this internationalisation of the Asian debate on human rights, It shifts the locus away from the practices of Asian governments and the restrictions on human rights. It enables the governments to attack as western stooges indigenous supporters of human rights. It leads to spurious stereotypes, of '.'orientalism" and "occidentalism", with either defensive Eastern counterparts of western universalism or aggressive retreat into an imagined part or culture. It politicises the question of human rights in an unproductive way.

11.1 turn first to "official" views of human rights of a number of influential Asian countries (Singapore, China, Malaysia, Indonesia). These views have developed primarily in response to two contingencies: the imperatives of control, and confrontation with western pretensions. They are therefore formulated somewhat defensively. It also means, because they are an engagement and a debate with the west, that they are formulated in universalistic terms, in the usual discourse of human rights. Several ingredients constitute the official view I am discussing. One which flows directly from both the contingencies is the assertion of "domestic jurisdiction" over human rights. Human rights are encapsulated within state sovereignty; the national treatment of human rights is no concern of other states or the international community. Self-determination, a concept which has been used to advance claims of human rights, is regarded as irrelevant to independent states. This position runs contrary to the contemporary view that human rights are a matter of international concern and that its gross violations entitle the international community to intervene in domestic situations to redress violations. In its 'White Paper" Human Rights in China (1991), the Chinese government stated that 'despite its international aspect, the issue of human rights falls by and large within the sovereignty of each state". The Chinese delegation to the UN Commission on Human Rights at its meeting in February 1993 urged that the World Conference in Vienna should "reiterate the principle of state sovereignty contained in the UN Charter and international law which is the basis for the realisation of human rights. Only when the state sovereignty is fully respected can the implementation of human rights be really ensured." This is also pre-eminently the position of the other countries mentioned above.

Another element in the official view is the relativity of rights, determined by the economic and political circumstances of each country. The Bangkok Governmental Declaration "recognises that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds". This stance reflects. the position in the Chinese White Paper which states that 'the evolution of the situation in regard to human rights is circumscribed by the historical, social, economic and cultural conditions of various nations, and involves a process of historical development. Owing to tremendous differences in historical background, social system, cultural tradition and economic development, countries differ in their understanding and practice of human rights." The Chinese use this framework to establish the priority of social and economic rights in their country, and much of the Paper is taken up with an account of the ending of pre-Communist regime practices of feudalism and other forms of human exploitation and the steady progress since in nutrition, education, health, the position of women and the disabled. Other countries too have used the state of national economic development as explanations for the failure fully to guarantee the complete range of human rights ('to eat their fill and dress warmly were the fundamental demands of the Chinese people who had long suffered cold and hunger").

There are two major implications of this relativist position on human rights. The first relates to conditionalities of political stability; and the other to the primacy of economic development.

The implications of the first represent restrictions on civil and political rights. A forthright statement of this position is to be found in pronouncements of the Singapore Government following the detention of various social workers and activists in May 1987. I quote here from one such statement (dated 24 June 1987 and addressed by the Minister for the Home Affairs to US Congressmen who had written to complain about the detentions). It compared the "resilience and cohesiveness" and shared values of the US nation (which presumably makes possible the tolerance of human rights) to the fragility and heterogeneity of Singapore. "We are vulnerable to powerful centrifugal forces and volatile emotional tides. Like many other developing countries, Singapore's major problem of nationhood is simply to stay united as one viable nation. In our short history, Singapore has repeatedly encountered subversive threats from within and without. To combat these threats to the nation, the usual procedures of court trials, which apply in Singapore to most criminal cases have proved totally inadequate. The very secrecy of covert operations precludes garnering evidence to meet the standards of the criminal law for conviction. In many cases of racial agitation, the process of trial itself will provide further opportunity for inflammatory. rabble rousing. Singapore cannot be ruled in any other way. Preventive detention is not a blemish marring our record; it is a necessary power underpinning our freedom (Another aspect of Singapore by passing the formal legal system, with its guarantees of fairness, not discussed in the minister's statement, is the taped and doctored "confessions" extracted from the detainees under some coercion, and then shown 6n the national television as proof of guilt and calculated to destroy their credibility and dignity.) These remarks were directed at a justification of administrative powers of detention without any kind of trial, but similar arguments have been used to justify other curtailments of civil rights, like the right to associate and assemble, of peaceful marches, of speech and expression. The Chinese Paper says that the people's right to subsistence will be threatened in the event of social turmoil or other disasters, and that it is the fundamental wish and demand of the Chinese people and a long term, urgent task of the Chinese government to maintain national stability and concentrate their efforts on developing productive forces.

The economic backwardness of Asia has been used to established the primacy of economic development over human rights. The argument is, in part, that civil and political rights are neither meaningful nor feasible in conditions of want or poverty. Therefore the first priority of state policy must be to promote economic development. It is implied that economic development may well require restrictions of human rights, both to provide a secure political framework in which it can be pursued and to remove obstacles in its way (e.g., through forced movement of people from lands required for "development"). The opposition of human rights and development is assumed rather than proved by argument and illustration. It is also used to establish the priority as between different kinds of rights, in which civil and political rights occupy a lowly position (in part a response to an argument that human rights are indivisible, and all of them enjoy an equal status).

The emphasis these governments purportedly place on economic development has led them to support the right to development. This rights is a matter of considerable contention internationally, with developing countries arraigned on the side supporting it, and most developed countries united in their opposition to it. It certainly does not have the quality of other kinds 6f rights, which inhere in individuals or groups and for the most part are entitlements against the state. Nevertheless the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted, in the face of abstentions by most western states, a Declaration on the Right to Development 4 December 1986. The Declaration ties the realisation of human rights in the developing countries to international economic aid for them and gives to 'peoples" (presumably meaning "states') the right to "participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realised". In return for these several concessions are made in emphasising.the indivisibility of rights and the claims of individuals to full participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting from it.

The Declaration is a fuzzy document, trying to be all things to all persons. So while there are sections of it which can be used to advance the (more traditional) cause of human rights, the gist of it is an attempt to establish reasons for the failure of the realisation of human rights in the international economic and political systems (including encroachments on the principle and practice of self-determination), while affirming that the primary responsibility for human rights is vested in states as part of their sovereignty. In other words, the rich countries must provide economic assistance to the poor countries, but must not question their human rights situation. the western riposte to the Declaration has been a massive imposition of political conditionalities on economic assistance and indeed, in the case of China, on economic relations and cooperation). The Declaration is also an attempt to provide an alternative framework for the international discourse on human rights. It shifts the focus from domestic arenas (where most violations of human rights take place) to the international, takes attention away from specific rights, for example, speech, assembly, social welfare to an ambiguous portmanteau right of development, for which in the nature of third world affairs, the state must take the responsibility in defining and implementing it. Through the Declaration, Asian governments seek to promote the ideology of developmentalism, which justifies repression at. home and the evasion of responsibility abroad.

Another Asian initiative in changing the framework for the discourse on human rights is even more fundamental. The approaches discussed so far have taken the western discourse as the main framework and have advanced qualifications it or provided justification for derogation from its value. Some governments have put forward the argument that the cultural matrix within which relations between individuals and the state are embedded are fundamentally different in Asia from that in the West. This matrix governs the nature and salience of human rights. This approach has been taken up aggressively in Singapore and Malaysia (less so in China, where the government's residual loyalty to Marxist thought is inconsistent with the adoption of this cultural approach, especially since so much of it based on semi-feudal thought in Asia).

I take as the basis of my discussion of this point an official statement of the government of Singapore, Shared Values (1991). The context of this White Paper is a concern of the government that the cultural values of its people are under attack from foreign ideas and values. It poses the rhetorical question, "Can we build a nation of Singaporeans, in Southeast Asia, on the basis of values and concepts native to other peoples, living in other environments?" It goes on, "If we are not to lose our bearings, we should preserve the cultural heritage of each of our communities, and uphold certain common values which capture the essence of being a Singaporean". It then finds certain perceptions and values which are common to the different ethnic communities of Singapore and which also distinguish them from society in the west. The key section of the Paper is devoted a discussion of the relationship between the individual and society. Disputing the proposition that value are universal and common to all mankind, it states that there is a major difference between Asian and Western values in the balance each strikes between the individual and the community; Asian societies emphasise the interest of the community, while Western societies stress the rights of the individual. The Singapore society has always weighted group interests more heavily than individual ones. "This balance has strengthened social cohesion, and enabled Singaporeans to pull together
to surmount difficult challenges collectively, more successfully than other societies. An emphasis on the community has been a key survival value for Singapore."

The core values of Asian society are identified as placing society above self, upholding the family as the building block of society, and resolving major issues through consensus instead of contention. There is a strong element of Confucianism in this elaboration, although the government denies that the values it propagates are purely Confucian It, however, picks up an element of Confucian teaching as particularly relevant to Singapore. 'The concept of government by honorable men (junzi), who have a duty to do right for the people, and who have the trust and respect of the population, fits us better than the Western idea that a government should be given as limited powers as possible, and should always be treated with suspicion unless proven otherwise." The supremacy of political authorities is emphasised by the first of the Shared Values, Nation before Community". Another aspect of Asian values, implicit though not explicit in the Paper, is the importance of duty as a counterpoint to right. The cohesion of society as well as the fulfillment of the individual is secured through a chain and hierarchy of duties. (The primacy of the notion of duty is emphasised elaborately both in the Chinese and Indian constitutions).

The individual does not disappear altogether as a bearer of rights in the Singapore Paper. However, characteristically the concern with the individual is expressed more in terms of the obligations of the community to look after its advantaged members. (In Singapore there is a twist to this, in that the "community" in question is the ethnic community of the individual, not the state, "to avoid the dependent mentality and severe social problems of a welfare state as experienced in many developed states", laying the foundations of a kind of community corporatism in the wake of declining popularity of the ruling party, showing how much these questions are viewed in that country from the perspectives of governance and management.)

Cultural "embeddedness" is not the only justification for this view of the relationship between the individual and the community and the interposition of the family. It is also said to be rooted in more pragmatic considerations. The White Paper hints at this, but it has been developed elsewhere. In at least Southeast Asia, there is a strongly held view that an authoritarian political system is the secret of its economic success (a point I have already mentioned earlier), and the frequent Singaporean mocking of the democratic efforts of the Philippines (with a rather inefficient economy) is advanced as proof of it. But there is also the belief that it is not the individual but the family (tied in to a network of clan associations and relationships) which has been at the forefront of the phenomenal economic success of the region. There appears to be the view of a significant number of people (primarily but not only among the business community as is well evidenced in the debates in Hong Kong) that this combination of authoritarian rule and family and kinship networks lies at the root of economic success. This model (which reverses the normal understanding of the relationship between the market, individualism and the rule of law) is seen as threatened by democracy and human rights (in a neat reversal of western perceptions of the positive link between the market and human rights). Hence democracy and human rights are not high on many people's agenda.

III. Before I turn to other Asian voices, I offer a brief critique of my own of some aspects of the official perspectives I have outlined above (although, as I discuss later, these views are not entirely devoid of merit). The "communitarian" argument suffers from at least two weaknesses. First, it overstates the "individualism" of western society and traditions of thought. Even within western liberalism, there are strands of analysis which assert claims of the community (for example Rousseau); and most western human rights instruments allow limitations on and derogation from human rights in the public interest, or for reasons of state. Western courts regularly engage in the task of balancing the respective interests of the individual and the community. Furthermore, liberalism does not exhaust western political thought or practice. There is social democracy, which emphasises collective and economic rights, and Marxism, which elevates the community to a high moral order, is also reflective of an important school of western thought. There is much celebration in western political thought of "civil society".

Secondly, Asian governments (notwithstanding the attempt in the Singapore Paper to distinguish the "community") fall into the easy but wrong assumption that they or the state are the "community". (A similar conflation occurs in the Mrican Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights.) Nothing can be more destructive of the community than this conflation. The community and state are different Institutions, and to some extent in a contrary juxtaposition. The community, for the most part, depends on popular norms developed through forms of consensus and which are enforced through mediation and persuasion. The state is an imposition on society, and unless humanised and democratised (as it has not been in most of Asia), it relies on edicts, military, coercion and sanctions. It is the tension between them which has underpinned human rights. In the name of the community, most Asian governments have stifled social an4 political initiatives of private groups. Most of them have draconian legislation like the British colonially inspired Societies Act which gives. the government pervasive control over civil society. Similarly rights to assemble and march peacefully have been mortgaged to the government. Governments have destroyed many communities in the name of development or state stability, and the consistent refusal of most of them to recognise that there are indigenous peoples among their population (who have a right to preserve their traditional culture, economy and beliefs) is but one demonstration of their lack of commitment to the real community. The vitality of the community comes from the exercise of the rights to organise, meet, debate and protest, dismissed as liberal" rights by these governments. It is ironic that the "community" is much more lively and significant in the supposedly individualistically orientated western states than in Asian states which are in the custody of governments which pay lip services to the community (even to the extent, as in Singapore; of defining values for the community!). (Nor is the tight regulation of society as in Singapore and Malaysia particularly Conlucian.)

Another attack on the community comes from the economic policies of the governments. As I have mentioned, for the most part these are market policies. Although Asian capitalism appears to rely on the family and clan associations, there is little doubt that it weakens the community and its cohesion. The organising matrix of the market is not the same as that of the community. Nor are values or methods particularly "communitarian". The moving frontier of the market, seeking new resources, has been particularly disruptive of communities which have managed to preserve intact a great deal of their culture and organization during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Market policies have relied greatly on multi-national capital and corporations, which have brought new values and tastes, and are increasingly integrating their economies and elites into a global economy and culture. Indeed it is these very considerations which prompted the Singapore White Paper, but the contradictions of official policies largely escaped its authors. It totally ignored the impact, indeed the onslaught, of modern technologies on traditional communities.

A final point is the contradiction between claims of a consensus and harmonious society and the extensive arming of the state apparatus. The pervasive use of draconian legislation like administrative detention, dis-establishment of societies, press censorship, sedition etc., belies claims to respect alternative views, promote a dialogue, and seek consensus. The contemporary state intolerance of opposition is inconsistent with traditional communal values and processes. I feel that the contemporary state processes 1i~ Asia are worse than the much derided adversarial processes of the west, which at least ensure that all parties get a fair hearing.

IV. Non-official voices are many. For reasons of space, I concentrate on the views of the NGOs. But there are other voices that must be taken into account. The views on human rights of the most oppressed are not articulated, or when articulated, are not heard. They are the worst victims of the denial of human rights, and in desperation they turn to violence or other dramatic challenges to authority. An important and articulate group are intellectuals who are alienated from the state, and for the most part are not apologists for the regime. Intellectuals respond to and engage in international debates; and like the NGOs they form networks with their counterparts in other parts of the world. Like the NGOs they have a commitment to human rights and democracy (even in China there is a growing and vibrant academic community with a keen interest in human rights and constitutionalism). They are less ready to accept western conceptions in totality, and attempt to relate questions of human rights to specific national conditions.

An authoritative statement of the position of Asian NGOs was issued on 27 March 1993 on the occasion of the Asian intergovernmental conference on human rights preceding the Vienna World Conference. It endorsed its commitment to the view that human rights are universal, and are equally rooted in different cultures. While it supported cultural pluralism, it condemned those cultural practices which derogate from universally accepted human rights. Since in its view human rights are of universal concern and universal value, it does not regard the advocacy of human rights as an encroachment upon national sovereignty. Indeed it recommends international co-operation and solidarity for the promotion of human rights, as a refutation of claims of national sovereignty over human rights issues. The NGO signatories of the statement support the principle of the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights.

if in these perspectives the view of the NGOs are at variance with those of governments, there is some common ground on other points. The NGOs attribute the poor state of human rights to the international economic order; whose reform through structural changes as well as the adoption of a Convention on the Right to Development, they argue. Unlike governments, they see a much closer connection with domestic oppression and international exploitation, in the collaboration of local economic and political elites with multinational corporations and aid agencies. Unlike the governments, they are critical of the consequences of the market system. They share with governments the desire to establish a broad framework for the analysis of human rights, but their framework (unlike that of governments which is informed by a statist view of development) is suffused. with notions of social justice, eradication of poverty through equitable distribution of resources and the empowerment of people, especially of women and other disadvantaged communities.

The NGOs also part company with governments in their assessment of the state of human rights, which they. find marked by massive and terrible violations of these rights and pervasive lawlessness on the part of state authorities. They deplore the militarisation of their governments and societies which is a primary cause of these violations. Their prescription for the ills of their countries is thorough going democracy and an unambiguous recognition and enforcement of human rights.

V. It is clear that it is no longer possible for Asian governments, NGOs or scholars to ignore the international discourse of human rights. Nor have they chosen to do so. Even China has engaged vigorously in this discourse, refusing to accept a purely defensive position even in the face of criticism about the massacre in Tianenman Square, arbitrary detention, extensive use of capital punishment, and prison labour. It has instead opted to establish the legitimacy of a distinctive approach to human rights. Other countries have also tried to establish a distinctive Asian approach. This is surely a proper position, for the context of human rights is delineated by the social and economic conditions of the place and the time. So-called universal human rights of the west have evolved over a long period of European history, responding to the changing configurations of power and the tasks of each epoch of history. Claims of universality and indivisibility of rights are hard to sustain in the face of the west's history of the oppression of its own people and of others, with slavery...which once enjoyed religious approbation, abuse of child labour, the exploitation of colonies and the other degradations of imperialism and racism. Nor is the process complete. Social welfare rights were acknowledged only in this century, and the appalling degradation of the environment has now set the stage for a new conception of rights and responsibilities, in which the community will have to be accorded a key position as a bearer of rights as well as duties. There is no reason why contemporary concerns and fads in the west should define- the parameters of international discourse in and aspirations of human rights.

If human rights have to be located in their social and economic contexts, what are the appropriate features that constitute the context for them in Asia? We should first perhaps abandon the search for a set of features that explain the whole Asian context, since there is such a marked diversity among Asian countries. There appears to be no common context between the small, urbanised, economically prosperous Singapore and the vast, impoverished, largely rural India. I have already indicated that the attempt to establish a common context through the invocation of a common and distinctive culture is spurious. I do not argue that culture is irrelevant, but that the implications drawn from it by governments are disingenuous.

If one may generalise (despite my preceding remarks), the following specifics of the Asian situation stand out. The first point is that the function of human rights (and discourse on them) in Asia is quite different from that in the west. Human rights in the west have responded to the configurations of power and economic relationships as they have evolved over a long period. They are consequently consistent with the patterns and structures of authority, and people's aspirations as well as expectations. There are no serious competing paradigms of political organization. The role of human rights is to fine tune the administrative and judicial systems and fortify rights and freedoms that ale largely uncontroversial. In Asia, on the other hand, human rights have a transformative potential. They are a constant challenge to vested interests and authority in societies given by enormous disparities 9f wealth and power, with traditions of authoritarianism and the helplessness of disadvantaged communities, of militarisation and the conjunction of corrupt politicians and predatory domestic and international capital. Human rights are therefore a terrain for struggle for power and the conceptions of good society. It is for this precise reason that Asian governments have engaged in the debate with the west which I outlined above; the real audience is, of course, their own people.

The second point is that there are massive violations of human rights in Asia; of women and children, of lower castes and otherwise disadvantaged communities, of ethnic minorities, of workers. Violations range over the whole conspectus of human rights; civil and political rights, as well as cultural, social and economic; there are mass killings and widespread disappearances; torture; wide displacements of communities from their traditional abode; arbitrary detentions and extensive censorship of thought and expression. The state is a major culprit, brutalising whole populations, but massive violations also take place in and through civil society, sometimes with the connivance of the state, and frequently reflecting feudalistic and patriarchal dimensions of culture. Social conflicts, particularly those stemming from ethnic difference, have politicised and militarised civil society in many states.

The third point is that despite these violations, human rights consciousness is low. Explanations for this paradox may lie in the weight of Q oression over centuries, a fatalistic acceptance of one's miseries, obstacles placed in the way of those who would seek to make explicit to the downtrodden the causes of their oppression. It certainly lies in the ethnic divisions of societies; ethnic consciousness can dull human rights consciousness, for the oppression of others is frequently viewed as their just rewards. A major challenge to human rights workers is undoubtedly this ethnic consciousness, which compels a perception of outsiders as less than human. Another cause of low human rights consciousness may be widespread poverty. Poverty is agr eat cause of denial of human rights. The international system refuses to accept this reality - for largely political reasons. It refuses to acknowledge t that poverty destroys human diity; and without human dignity there can be no human rights; or indeed the capacity to challenge the system of oppression.

Thus economic development is undoubtedly important. But not just any kind of economic development. Economic growth must be accompanied by a wide measure of egalitarianism, the protection of the rights of workers, particularly migrant workers, and democratic practices at work places. Nor must economic growth be undertaken at the expense of land, customs and autonomy of long settled communities. Unless these and other community concerns are safeguarded in the process of economic growth, development is perverse and adds to tbe violations of human rights and dignity.

A further point about human rights in Asia is that challenges to their violations are not individual based but group or class based. This is particularly the case in multi-ethnic states. The protection of human rights therefore pursued through the group. This fact, and that the state is a major violator of human rights, suggests strategies that are different from the traditional western approaches, which are legalistic and court centred. Asian strategies cannot realistically be court centred, however favourably the judiciaries may be disposed towards human rights (and for the most part they are not). Human rights conscientisation and mobilisation based on connections between them and their oppression are a fundamental starting point (connections which neither local governments nor the west are anxious should be made).

Nor must the term in of struggle be purely domestic. Despite the resistance of governments, the realisation of human rights in each country is intimately tied to wider global forces (particularly in the contemporary world wide pursuit of marketisation). Even today many governments in the third world are surrogates for external economic and political interests, and it is necessary to take the battle to the homelands of these interests, just as it is necessary to recruit foreign interests to put pressure on domestic governments which deny their people the right to participate in decisions affecting their own destiny. Fruitful Asian perspectives on human rights must therefore transcend obfuscation of culturalism, locate human rights in the contingencies of their political economy, and urge struggle domestically as well as globally since no economies now are purely national.

(professor Yash Ghai is the Sir YK Pao Professor of Public Law of the University of Hong Kong)